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CHANGING the 
SUBJECT
In the European left the talk is of ‘N ew Times’ — after 
industrialism, mass production and the mass market. 
Consumption and lifestyle, not production and work, 
have been the catchcries of the decade. Stuart Hall 
argues that it represents a revolution o f the subjective 
dimension against the iron-clad certainties o f the 
old left.
T here is a good deal of talk these days about “new times”. This discussion is of great political 
significance, for two reasons. “New 
times” are associated with the 
ascendancy of the Right in Britain, 
the US and many parts of Europe. 
But “new times” will also provide the 
co n d itio n s  — p rop itiou s or 
unpropitious, depending on how we 
judge them — for an; renewal of the 
Left and the project of socialism.
However, there are some real 
problems with this discourse of “new 
times". How new are they? Is it the 
dawn of the new age or only the 
whimper of an old one? How do we 
characterise what is “new" about 
them? How do we assess their 
contradictory tendencies? Are they 
progressive or regressive? What 
promise do they hold out for a more 
democratic and egalitarian future? 
What political meaning do they 
have? What are their political 
consequences?
So fa r as descr ipt ion  is 
concerned, there are several terms 
which have been employed to 
characterise these transitional times. 
Potential candidates would include 
“post-industrial”, “post-Ford ist", 
“revolution of the subject”, “post­
modernism”. None of these is wholly 
satisfactory. Each expresses a clearer 
sense of what we are leaving behind 
(“post") than where we are heading.
“Post-industrial” writers, like Alain 
Touraine and Andre Gor?, start from 
shifts in the technical organisation of 
industrial capitalist production, with 
its “classic” large-scale labour 
processes, division of labour and 
class conflicts. They foresee a shift to 
new productive regimes with 
consequences for social structure and 
politics. Touraine has written of the 
replacement of older forms of class 
s t ruggl e  by the new social  
movements.
“Post-Fordism ” is a broader 
term, suggesting a whole new epoch 
distinct Irom the era of mass 
production. Though the debate still 
rages as to whether “post-Fordisr " 
exists, most commentators wou 1 
agree that it covers at least some of 
the following characteristics: a shift 
to  th e  new  “ i n f o r m a t i o n  
t e c h n o l o g i e s ” ; more  f lexible,  
decent ral i sed forms of  l abour  
process and work organisation; 
decline of the old manufacturing 
base and the growth of the "sunrise", 
comput e r -based  industries;  the 
hivtng-off or contracting-out of 
functions and services; a greater 
emphasis on choice and product 
di f ferent iat ion,  on market ing,  
packaging and design, on the 
“ t arge t t i ng” of  consumer s  by 
lifestyle, taste and culture rather than 
by the sociological categories of 
social class; a decline in the
proportion of the skilled male, 
manual working class, the rise of the 
service and white-collar classes and 
the “feminisation” of the workforce; 
an economy dominated by the 
multinationals, with their new 
international division of labour and 
their greater autonomy from nation­
state control; the ’‘globalisation" of 
the new financial markets, linked by 
the communications revolution; and 
new forms of the spatial organisation 
of social processes.
An issue that must perplex us is 
how total or complete this transition 
to post-Fordism is. But this may be a 
too all-or-nothing way of posing the 
q u e s t i o n .  In a p e r ma n e n t l y  
transitional age we must expect 
u n e v e n n e s s ,  c o n t r a d i c t o r y  
outcomes ,  di s junctures .  delays, 
contingencies, uncompleted projects, 
overlapping emergent ones. We 
know that  earl ier  transit ion* 
(feudalism to capitalism, household 
production to modern industry) all 
turned out, on inspection, to be more 
pi otracted and incomplete than the 
theory suggested.
We have to make assessments, 
not from the completed base, but 
from the "leading edge’’ of change. 
The food industry, which has just 
arrived at the point where it can 
guarantee worldwide the standard­
isation of the Mze, shape and 
composition of every hamburgerand
ev --ry potato (.«»■) chip in a 
Macdonald's Big Mac from lokyoto
H.irare, is clearly lust entering its 
Fnrdist apogee. However, motor 
tins, from which the age of Fordism 
dr i ved ils name, with its multiple 
va ialions on every model and 
market specialisation (like the 
fashion and software industries), is at 
the leading edge of post-Fordism. 
The question should always be, 
where is the “leading edge” and in 
what direction is it pointing. "Post- 
Fordism” is also associated with 
broader social and cultural changes. 
For example, greater fragmentation 
and pluralism, the weakening of 
older collective solidarities and block 
indentities and the emergence of new 
identities associated with greater 
work flexibility, the maximisation of 
individual choices through personal 
consumption.
The wider changes remind us 
that “new times” are both "out 
there”, changing our conditions of 
life, and "in here”, working on us. In 
part, it is us who are being “re-made”.
A recent writer on the subject, 
Marshal l  Berman,  notes that ,  
" m o d e r n  e n v i r o n m e n t s  an d  
experiences cut across all boundaries 
of geography and ethnicity, of class 
and nationality, of religion and 
ideology” — not destroying them 
ent i re ly ,  bu t  we a k e n i n g  and 
subverting them, eroding the lines of 
continuity which hitherto stabilised 
our social identities.
One boundary' which “new times” 
have displaced is that between the 
“ o b j e c t i v e ”  a n d  s u b j e c t i v e  
d i m e n s i o n s  o f  c h a n g e .  T h e  
individual subject has become more - 
important. While our models of “the 
subject" have altered. We can no 
longer conceive of “the individual” in 
terms of a whole and completed Ego 
or autonom ous "self”. The “self” is 
experienced as more fragmented and 
incomplete, composed of multiple 
“selves" or ident itics in relation to the 
different social worlds we inhabit, 
s o m e t h i n g  wi t h  a h i s t o r y ,  
"produced”, in process. These 
vicissitudes of “the subject" have 
their own histories which are key 
episodes in the passage to "new 
times”. They include the cultural 
revolutions of the 1960s; “ 1968
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itself, with its strong sense of politics 
as "theatre”; feminism’s slogan that 
“ t he  p e r s o n a l  is p o l i t i c a l ” ; 
psychoanalysis, with its rediscovery 
of the unconsc ious root s  of 
s u b j e c t i v i t y ;  t h e  t h e o r e t i c a l  
revolutions of the ’60s and 70s — 
sem io tics, s t ructura l i sm,  p o s t­
structuralism — with their concern 
for language and representation.
This "return ot the subjective” 
aspect suggests that we cannot settle 
for a language in which to describe 
“new times” which respects the old 
distinction between the objective and 
subjective dimensions of change. But 
such a conceptual shift presents 
p r o b l e ms  for  the  Left .  The  
conventional culture of the Left, with 
its stress on “objective contra­
dictions", “impersonal structures” 
and processes that work “behind 
men’s (sic) backs”, has disabled us 
from confronting the subjective in 
politics in any very coherent way.
In part, the ditticulty lies in the 
very words and concepts we use. For 
long,  being a socia l i s t  was 
synonymous with the ability 10 
tran s la te  everything into the 
language of “structures”. In part, the 
difficulty lies in the fact that men, 
who so often provide the categories 
within which everybody experiences 
things, even on the Left, have always 
found the spectacle of the return of 
the subjective dimension deeply 
unnerving. The problem is also 
th eo re tica l. C lassical marxi sm 
d e p e n d e d  o n  a n  a s s u m e d  
c o r r e s p o n d e n c e  b e t w e e n  the  
"economic” and the “political”: one 
could read off our political attitudes, 
interests and motivations from our 
e c o n o mi c  c lass  i n t e res t s  and 
p o s itio n . This co rrespondence  
between “the political” and “the 
economic” is exactly what has now 
disintegrated — practically and 
theoretically. This has had the effect, 
inter alia, of throwing the language 
of politics more over to the cultural 
side.
"Post-modernism” is the term 
which signals this more cultural 
character of “new times”. The 
modernist movement, it argues, 
which dominated the art and 
a r c h i t e c t u r e ,  t h e  c u l t u r a l  
imagination, of the early decades of
the 20th century, and came lo 
represent the took and experience of 
“modernity" itself, is at an end. ft has 
declined into the international style 
of expressway, slab skyscraper and 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l  a i r p o r t .  I t s  
revolutionary impulse has been 
tamed and contained by the museum. 
“Post-modernism” celebrates the 
penet r a t i on of  aesthet ics into 
everyday life and the ascendancy of 
popular culture over the high arts.
Can a socialism o f the 21st 
century survive which is 
wholly cut off from the 
l a n d s c a p e s  o f  p o p u l a r  
pleasures?
T h e o r i s t s  l ike F r e d e r i c k  
Jameson and Jean-Francois Lyotard 
agree on many of the characteristics 
of “the post-modern condition”. 
They remark on the dominance of 
image, appearance, surface-effect 
over depth (is Ronald Reagan a 
president or just a B-movie actor, 
real or cardboard cut-out, alive or 
Spitting Image?); the blurring of 
image and reality (is the Contra war 
real or only happening on TV?); the 
preference for parody, nostalgia, 
kitsch and pastiche over more 
p o s i t i v e  m o d e s  o f  a r t i s t i c  
representation (like realism or 
naturalism); a preference for the 
popular and the decorative over the 
brutalist or the functional in 
architecture and design. They also 
comment on the erasure of a strong 
sense of history, the slippage of 
hi t her to stab le  m eanings, the 
proliferation of difference and the 
end of what Lyotard calls the “grand 
narratives” of progress, develop­
ment, enlightenment and rationality, 
which until recently were the 
f o u n d a t i o n s  of  al l  m o d e r n  
philosophy and political theory.
Both Jameson and Baudrillard 
see post-modernism as part of a “new 
cultural logic of capital” “the 
purest form of capital yet to have 
emerged, a prodigious expansion 
into hitherto uncommodified areas”. 
This brings home the fact that one 
term which is no longer much in use, 
though popular in the ’50s and '60s. is
“post-capitalist”. For the very good 
reason that the dynamic we are trying 
to characterise is connected with the 
revolutionary energy of modern 
capital — capita! after what we used 
to call its “highest stages’’.
There are different ways of 
explaining this dramatic, even 
brutal, resumption of the link 
between modernity and capitalism. 
Some argue that, though Marx may 
have been wrong in his predictions 
about class as the motor of 
revolution, he was right — with a 
vengeance — about capital: its global 
expansion, transforming everything 
in its wake, and subordinating every 
society and relationship under the 
law  o f c o mmo d i f i c a t i o n  and 
exchange value. Others argue that, 
with the failures of the stalinist and 
social  democrat i c  al ternatives,  
capital has acquired a new lease of 
life: Some economists believe that we 
are simply in the early, upbeat half of 
a new Kondratiev “long wave” of 
capitalist expansion. The American 
social critic. Marshall Berman, 
relates “new times” to “the ever- 
expanding,- drastically fluctuating 
capitalist world markets”. However, 
whichever explanation we finally 
settle for, the really startling fact is 
that these "new times” clearly belong 
to a time-zone marked by the march 
of capita! simultaneously across the 
globe and through the Maginot Lines 
of our subjectivities.
The title of Berman’s book 
reminds us that M arx was one of the 
ea rliest people to grasp  the 
revolutionary connection between 
capitalism and modernity, as well as 
the dialectical relationship between 
the "outside" and the “inside” of the 
p r o c e s s .  In t he  C o m m u n is t  
Manifesto, he spoke of the “constant 
revolut ioni s ing of  production,  
uninterrupted disturbance of all 
s oc i a l  r e l a t i o n s ,  ever l as t i ng 
uncertainty and agitation” which 
distinguished “the bourgeois epoch 
from all earlier times”. “ Al! fixed, 
fast-frozen relationships with their 
train of venerable ideas and opinions 
are swept away, all new-formed ones 
become obsolete before they can 
ossify. All that is solid melts intoair."
Indeed, as Berman points out. 
Marx considered the revolution of
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modern industry and production the 
necessary precondition for that 
promethean or romantic conception 
of the social individual which towers 
over his early writings, with its talk of 
the all-sided development of human 
capacities, it was not the things 
which the bourgeoisie created so 
much as “the processes, the powers, 
the expressions of human life and 
energy; men working, moving, 
c u l t i v a t i n g ,  c o m m u n i c a t i n g ,  
organising and reorganising nature 
and themselves ... "O fcourse, Marx 
also understood the one-sided and 
distorted character of the modernity 
and type of modern individual 
produced by this development — 
how the forms of bourgeois approp­
r iat ion destroyed  the hu man  
possibilities it created. But he did not 
refuse it. What he argued was that 
only socialism could complete the 
revolution of modernity which 
capitalism had initiated. He hoped 
“to heal the wounds of modernity 
t hrough a fuller and deeper 
modernity”. Now here exactly is 
the rub about “new times” for the 
Left. The “promise" of modernity 
has become, at the end of the 20th 
c e n t u r y ,  c o n s i d e r a b l y  mo r e  
ambiguous, its links with socialism 
and the Left much more tenuous. We 
have become more aware of the 
double-edged  and problemat i c  
ch a rac te r  of moderni ty;  what  
T h e o d o r e  A d o r n o  cal l ed t he 
"negative dialectics” of enlighten­
ment. Of course, to be “m odern” has 
always meant “to live a life of 
paradox and contradiction... alive to 
new possibilities for experience and 
adventure ,  f r ightened by the 
nihilistic depths to which so many 
modern adventures lead (the line 
from Nietzsche and Wagner to the 
death camps?), longing to create and 
hold on to something real even as 
everything melts”.
But today, the paradoxes seem 
even more extreme. “M odernity” has 
acquired a relentlessly uneven and 
contradictory character. Abundance 
here, producing poverty there. 
Greater adversity and choice — but 
o ften  at th e  cost o f  more  
fragmentation and isolation. More 
opportunities for participation — 
but only at  the expense of
subordinating oneself to the laws of 
the market. Novelty and innovation 
but driven by what appear to be 
false needs. The rich West and the 
famine-stricken South. Develop­
ment which destroys faster than it 
creates. The city, privileged scenario 
of the modern experience for 
Baudelaire or Walter Benjamin — 
transformed into the anonymous 
city, the sprawling city, the inner city.
These stark paradoxes project 
uncertainty into any secure judgment 
or assessment of the trends and 
tendencies of “new times”, especially 
on the Left. Are they to be welcomed 
for the new possibilities they open? 
Or rejected for their threat of 
horrendous disasters (the ecological 
ones are uppermost in our minds just 
now) and final closures? We seem, 
especially on the Left, permanently 
impaled on the horns of these 
e x t r e m e  a n d  i r r e c o n c i l a b l e  
alternatives.
It is imperative now for the Left 
to get past this impossible impasse, 
these irreconcilable either/ ors. There 
are few better (though many more 
fashionable) places to begin than 
with Gramsci's “Americanism and 
Fordism" essay, which is of seminal 
importance for this debate, even if it 
is also a broken and “unfinished" 
text. This represented a similar effort 
to describe  the dangers  and 
possibilities for the Left of the birth
of that epoch Fordism — which 
we are just supposed to be leaving: 
and in very similar circumstances — 
retreat and retrenchment of the 
w o r k i n g  c l a s s  m o v e m e n t ,  
ascendancy of fascism, new surge of 
capital “with its intensified economic 
exploi t a t i on and au t hor i t a r i an  
cultural expression”.
If we took our bearings from 
“Americanism and Fordism”, we 
would be obliged to note that 
G r a m s c i ’s ‘‘c a t a l o g u e  o f  . ..  
m ost i mpor t an t  or  in terestin g  
problems” relevant to deciding 
“ w h e t h e r  A m e r i c a n i s m  c a n  
constitute a new historical epoch” 
begins with “a new mechanism of 
accumulation and distribution of 
finance capital based directly on 
industrial production”But it also 
includes: the rationalisation of the 
d e m o g r a p h i c  c o m p o s i t i o n  of  
Europe;  the balance betw een 
endogenous and exogenous change; 
t h e  p h e n o m e n o n  o f  m a s s  
consumption and “high wages”, 
“psychoanalysis and its enormous 
diffusion since the war”; the 
increased “moral coercion "exercised 
by the state; “modernism”; what he 
calls “su p e r-c ity ” and “ super- 
country”; feminism, masculinism, 
and “the question of sex” Who, on 
the Left, now has the confidence to 
address the problems and promise of 
“new times” with a matching 
comprehensiveness and range?
This lack of boldness is 
certainly, in part, attributable to the 
fact that the contradictory forces 
associated with “new times” are, just 
now, and have been for some time, 
firmly in the keeping and under the 
tutelage of the Right. The Right 
has imprinted them with the 
inevitability of its own political 
project. This may have obscured the 
fact that what is going on is not the 
unrolling of a singular, unilinear 
logic in which the ascendancy of 
capital, the hegemony of the Right 
and the march of commodification 
are indissolubly locked together. 
They may be different processes, 
with different time scales, which the 
domi nance  of  the Right  has 
s omehow n a tu ra lised . But at 
this point, we encounter an even 
deeper problem. The Left seems not
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just displaced by these processes, but 
disabled, flattened, becalmed by 
the very prospect of change; afra id of 
rooting itself in “the new"and unable 
to make the leap of imagination 
required to engage the future. And 
nowhere more so than in this 
difficult area of finding a language in 
which to address the more subjective 
and cultural dimensions of the 
revolution of our times.
One strategy might be for the 
Left to accept this breaking-down of 
an objectivist political logic. All 
human action has both its subjective 
and its objective side. Once we accept 
the collapse of any automatic linkage 
between economic class position and 
political consciousness, we have to 
recognise that all commitments to act 
in politics have subjective as well as 
ob jective ro o ts . All in te rests , 
including class ones, are culturally 
and ideologically defined. And 
though individuals are not the 
“authors” of ideology in the sense of 
producing it out of nothing from 
inside our heads, ideologies must 
work on and through the subject, 
subject-ing us to their play, if they are 
to have force or effect. “New times" 
require us to radically rethink the 
link between history and subjectivity.
Another strategy would be to 
open our minds to the deeply cultural 
character of the revolution of our 
times. If “post-Fordism ” exists then, 
it is as much a description of cultural 
as of economic change. Indeed, that 
distinction is now quite useless. 
Culture has ceased to be, if ever it 
was, a decorative addendum to the 
“hard world" of production and 
things, the icing on the cake of the 
material world. The word is now as 
“m aterial" as the world. Through 
design, technology and styling, 
“aesthetics” has already penetrated 
the world of modern production. 
Through marketing, layout and 
style, the “image” provides the mode 
of representation of the body on 
wh i c h  so m u c h  of  m o d e r n  
consumption depends. And kids, 
black and white, who can’t even spell 
“post-modernism’’ but have grown 
up in the age of comput e r  
t e c h n o l o g y ,  r o c k - v i d e o  a n d  
electronic music, already inhabit 
such a universe in their heads.
Commodified consumption? 
Trivial pursuits? Yes, much of the 
time. But underlying that, have we 
missed the opening up of the 
individual to the transforming 
rhythms and forces of modern 
material life? Have we become 
bewitched by who, in the short run, 
reaps the p ro fits  from  these 
transactions, and missed the deep 
democratisation of culture which is 
also part of their hidden agenda? Can 
a socialism of the 21st century revive, 
or even survive, which is wholly cut 
off from the landscapes of popular 
pleasures, however contradictory a 
terrain they are? Are we thinking 
dialectically enough?
Yet another strategy for getting 
at the more cultural and subjective 
dimensions of change would be to 
start from the objective character­
istics of post-Fordism and simply 
turn them inside out. Take the new 
t echno l og i es .  They  not  only 
introduce new skills and practices. 
They also require new ways of 
thinking. Technology, which used to 
be “hard-nosed” is now “soft”. And it 
no longer operates along one, 
singular line or path of development. 
“Planning”, in this new technological 
environment, has less to do with 
instituting a “regime” out of which a 
plurality of outcomes will emerge. 
One, so to speak, plans for 
contingency. This mode of thinking 
signals the end of a certain kind of 
deterministic rationality.
Or consider the proliferation of 
models and styles, the increased 
produc t  di f ferent i at ion,  which 
c h a r a c t e r i s e s  p o s t - F o r d i s t  
production. We can see mirrored
there, too, wider processes of cultural 
diversity and differentiation, related 
to the multiplication of social worlds 
and social “logics” typical of modern 
life in the West.
There has been an enormous 
expansion of “civil society”, caused 
by the diversification of the different 
social worlds in which men and 
women can operate. At present, most 
people only relate to these worlds 
through the medium of consumpt­
ion. But each of these worlds also has 
its own codes of behaviour, its 
“scenes” and “economies”, and 
(don't knock it) its “pleasures”. These 
allow the individual some space in 
which to reassert a measure of choice 
and control over everyday life and to 
“play” with its more expressive 
dimensions. This “pluralisation” of 
social life expands the roles and 
identities available to ordinary 
people (at least in the developed 
world). Such opportunities need to 
be more, not less, widely available 
across the globe. They imply a 
“socialism” committed to, rather 
than scared of, diversity and 
difference.
Of course, “civil society" is no 
ideal realm of pure freedom. Its 
m i c r o - w o r l d s  i n c l u d e  the 
multiplication of points of power and 
conflict. More and more of our 
everyday lives are caught up with 
these forms of power, and their lines 
of intersection. Far from there being 
no resistance to the system, there has 
been a proliferation of new points of 
antagonism, new social movements 
of resistance organised around them 
and, consequently, a generalisation 
of “politics” to spheres which 
hitherto the Left assumed to be 
apolitical; a politics of the family, of 
health, of food, of sexuality, of the 
body. What we lack is any overall 
map of how these power relations 
connect and of their resistances. 
Perhaps there isn’t, in that sense, one 
“power game” at all, more a network 
of strategies and powers and their 
articulations — and thus a politics 
which is always positional ...
One of these critical “new” sites 
of politics is the arena of social 
reproduction. On the Left, we know 
about the reproduction of labour 
power. But what do we really know
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— outside of feminism — about 
i d e o l o g i c a l ,  c u l t u r a l ,  s e x u a l  
r e p r o d u c t i o n ?  O n e  o f  t h e  
characteristics of this area of 
"reproduction” is that it is both 
material and symbolic, since we are 
reproducing, not only the cells of the 
body but also the categories of the 
culture. Even consumption, in some 
ways the privileged terrain of 
reproduction, is no less symbolic for 
being material. In a world tyrannised 
by scarcity, people nevertheless 
express in their practical lives not 
only what they need for material 
existence but some sense of their 
symbolic place in the world, of who 
they are, their identities. One should 
not miss this drive to take part in the 
theatre of the social.
Of course, the preoccupation 
with consumption and style may 
appear trivial though more so to 
men. who tend to have themselves 
"reproduced” at arm ’s length from 
the grubby processes of shopping 
and buying and gettingand therefore 
take it less seriously than women for 
whom it was destiny, life’s ‘work" 
But the fact is that greater and 
greater numbers of people (men and 
women) — with however little money
— play the game of using things to 
signify who they are. Everybody, 
including people in poor societies 
whom we in the West frequently 
speak about as if they inhabit a world 
outside of culture, knows that 
today’s “goods” double up as social 
signs and produce meanings as well 
as energy. There is no evidence that, 
in a socia list economy,  our  
p r o p e n s i t y  to “ c o d e ”  t hings  
according to systems of meaning, 
which is an essential feature of our 
sociality, would necessarily cease 
or, indeed, should.
Thi s  r e cogn i t i on  o f the 
expanded cultural and subjective 
ground on which any socialism of the 
21st century must stand, relates, in a 
significant way, to feminism or, 
better still, what we might call “the 
feminisation of the social”, We 
should distinguish this from the 
simplistic version of “the future as 
f e m a l e ” , e s p o u s e d  by s o me  
tendencies within the women’s 
movement, but recently subject to
l.ynn Segal's persuasive critique. It
arises from the remarkable — and 
irreversible transformation in the 
position of women in modern life and 
the rebirth of a modern feminism 
itself.
Femini sm and the social 
movements around sexual politics 
have thus had an unsettling effect on 
everything once thought of as 
“settled” in the theoretical universe 
of the Left. And nowhere more 
dramatically than in its power to 
d e c e n t r e  t h e  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c  
conversations of th Left by bringing 
on to the political agenda the 
question of sexuality. This is more 
than the Left being “nice” to women 
or lesbians or gay men or beginning 
to address their forms of oppression. 
It has to do with the revolution in 
thinking which follows in the wake of 
the recognition that all social 
practices and forms of domination 
including the politics of the Left 
are always inscribed in and to some 
extent secured by sexual identity and 
positioning. If we don’t attend to 
how gendered identities are formed 
and transformed and how they are 
deployed politically, we simply do 
not have a language of sufficient 
explanatory power at our command 
with which to understand the 
institutionalisation of power in our 
society and the secret soruces of our 
resistances to change.
A f t e r  a n o t h e r  o f  t h o s e  
meetings of the Left where the 
question of sexuality has run like an 
electric current which nobody knows 
how to plug into, one is tempted to 
say especially the resistances to 
change on the Left.
Thatcherism is certainly fully 
aware of this implication of sexuality 
and identity in politics. It has 
powerfully organised itself around 
particular forms of patriarchy and 
cultural or national identity. Its 
defence of “ Englishness” is a key to 
some of the unexpected sources of 
Thatcherism's popularity. For that 
very reason, “Englishness”, as a 
privileged and restrictive cultural 
identity, is becoming a site of 
contestation from those ethnic and 
racial groups who insist on cultural 
diversity as a positive goal.
The Left should not be afraid of 
this surprising retain of ethnicity.
Though ethnicity has sometimes 
been a powerfully reactionary force, 
the new  forms of ethnicity are 
articulated, politically, in a different 
direction. By “ethnicity” we mean the 
commitment to those points of 
attachment which give the individual 
some sense of “place” and position in 
the world, whether these be in 
relation to particular communities, 
localities, territories. languages, 
religion or cultures. These days, 
black writers and film-makers refuse 
to be restricted only to addressing 
black subjects- But they insist that 
others recognise that what they have 
to say’ comes out of particular 
histories and cultures and that 
everyone speaks from positions 
within the global distribution of 
power. Because these positions 
change and alter, there is always a 
politics of position.
This insistence on “positioning" 
provides people with co-ordinates, 
which are specially important in the 
face of the enormous globalisation 
and transnational character of many 
of the processes which now shape 
their lives. The “new times" seem to 
have gone “global"and “local” at the 
same moment. And the question of 
ethnicity reminds us that everybody 
comes from some place — even if 
only an “imagined community" — 
a n d  n e e d s  s o m e  s e n s e  o f  
identification. A politics which 
neglects that moment is not likely to 
be able to command the “new times”.
Could there be “new times” 
without “new subjects’?  Have the 
forces remaking the modern world 
left the subjects of that process 
untouched? Is change possible while 
we remain untransformed? It was 
always unlikely and is certainly an 
untenable propositon now. It is one 
of those many “fixed and fast-frozen 
relationships, venerable ideas and 
opinions” which, as Marx predicted, 
"new times” quielty melted into air.
A longer version of (his article appeared in the 
October edition of Marxism Today, Published 
by arrangement.
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